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1. Introduction 
 
Human activity puts many substances in the atmosphere that can force climate change. 
They have widely varying characteristics. Some species stay in the atmosphere for a few 
days, some for tens of thousands of years. Some exert a forcing globally, while others 
cause a forcing in limited regions. Some species are emitted in large amounts, others in 
tiny quantities. Some species have a powerful warming effect per gram, others a much 
smaller effect, and yet other species cool the atmosphere. Some species influence the 
climate directly, while others have primarily an indirect effect by affecting the 
concentrations of other species. And emissions of some species have multiple impacts 
which themselves have widely varying characteristics. Different as these emissions may 
be, it is important that their climate effects be added up in order to answer questions 
about the various contributions of countries and sectors to climate change, and about the 
priorities in emission reduction. Climate scientists and economists have proposed four 
classes of “equivalences” between climate changing species, and there are occasionally 
heated debates about which “metric” is the better one (1-31). The classes are: 
 
• Global Warming Potential (32, 33); 
• Global Damage Potential (7); 
• Global Cost Potential (21); and 
• Global Temperature change Potential (27, 29). 
 
Here we show that these “exchange rates” are special cases of a single, unifying 
framework. This clarifies the relationships between them. The paper shows that some 
metrics require more knowledge than others while others make more stringent 
assumptions than some. It also argues that some metrics are appropriate in certain 
contexts but not in others. 
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Adding together the climate impact of species that have different characteristics is a bit 
like adding apples and oranges. There is no single unique way that this can be done. 
However, sometimes one just has to. If one transports things, then one would add apples 
and oranges by their weight or volume. This is not because “weight” is the only attribute 
that makes an apple an apple and an orange an orange. Rather, this is because weight is 
the main thing that matters in transport. Similarly, a nutritionist would add apples and 
oranges by their nutrient content. A grocer might add apples and oranges by their selling 
prices. To put it abstractly, the metric of aggregation depends on the purpose of 
aggregation. 
 
This may be unsettling. There is no universal way of aggregation. There is no best 
method. There are multiple truths, or rather: there are multiple perspectives on the same 
reality. Transporters and nutritionists have different viewpoints. As apples are rich in 
vitamin A, and oranges in vitamin C, nutritionists would differ too – or rather, a 
nutritionist would give different recommendations to clients with different problems. 
Adding emissions is like adding apples and oranges: different problems require different 
solutions. And there are pragmatic considerations too. A transporter would not weigh 
every single box of apples and oranges, but rather use an average weight. The same holds 
for aggregating different emissions. The theoretically preferred option may be 
impractical. 
 
One may argue for a metric that averages across several properties. However, the average 
of weight, vitamin C content, and selling price is meaningless to the transporter, the 
nutritionist and the grocer. Trying to serve different purposes at once in fact may mean 
that no purpose is served. Adding the climate impact of emissions is similar. Different 
stakeholders and different policies will require different metrics. There is no one size that 
fits all and the average size might fit no one. 
 
In the context of climate change it is the very different time and spatial scales of both 
removal of the different forcing agents and the potential damages of warming that cause 
the problems. Thus a climate policy designed to mitigate long term sea level rise would 
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put more emphasis on mitigation of long lived forcing agents, than a policy that considers 
short term rate-of -change impacts (e.g. ability of biological systems to adapt) as the main 
potential damage. The decision regarding what constitutes a “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” involves value judgements and thus cannot be 
solved by scientists alone. However, once this has been determined (e.g. the EU’s goal of 
restricting global temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels), metrics can be 
designed based on objective, scientific methods. 
 
In the next section, we start with a cost-benefit framework for assigning the appropriate 
weights to different emissions. These ratios are called Global Damage Potentials. We 
show that with three additional assumptions, the Global Damage Potential is equivalent 
to the Global Warming Potential as used in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
We argue that these assumptions are simplistic, but also that more realistic assumptions 
are uncertain and even controversial. 
 
In Section 3, we show that the more commonly used cost-effectiveness framework is a 
special case of cost-benefit analysis, although it reflects a completely different policy 
perspective. We derive the appropriate metric for comparing emissions in a cost-
effectiveness analysis (Global Cost Potentials), and show under what circumstances this 
is equivalent to the purely physical concept of Global Temperature change Potentials. 
We do this for targets on the level of climate change. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Global Warming Potentials and Global Damage Potentials 
Consider a decision-maker who wants to minimize the net losses due to climate change 
and climate policy. If emissions of only one component contribute to climate change, the 
problem to be solved is1 
 
(1) 
0
( , )min
(1 )
t t
tR t
L R D
ρ
∞
= +∑  
                                                 
1 The derivations assume that policy and time progress in discrete steps of equal length. This assumption is 
not necessary, but it greatly reduces the complexity of the exposition. 
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where L is the net loss function, say in monetary units, which depends on emission 
reduction R and damages D, with ∂L/∂R>0 and ∂L/∂D>0; ρ is the discount rate. Damages 
depend on climate change; let’s use global-average surface temperature T as an indicator. 
Similarly, we use the total costs of emission reduction and the total impacts of climate 
change as high level indicators, abstracting from distributional issues of costs and 
impacts. The global mean temperature T depends on the full history of the emissions. The 
complex interactions and the various time scales of the climate system imply that a 
simulation with a comprehensive 3-D global climate model is required to estimate the full 
effect on T over time. This is certainly not feasible for a metric that is intended for policy 
use. To simplify the evaluation, radiative forcing F is often used to give a first-order 
estimate of the impacts of different emissions (33). Radiative forcing F, in turn depends 
on concentration C, and hence on a scenario of assumed emissions E and possible 
emission reductions R, so that the actual emissions are given by E-R. Although a system 
of difference equations is the most convenient way of computing Equation (1), it can also 
be expressed as: 
 
(1) ∑∞
=
−
+0
01
)1(
))),...,,((,(
min
t
t
ttttt
R
FFFTDRL
ρ  
 
where the radiative forcing at any given time is a function of concentrations at that time, 
which in turn are a function of the history of reference emissions and reductions (E and 
R), that is: 
 
(2) . )),...,,,...,(( 00 RREECfF tttt =
The first order conditions are 
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This means that, in the optimum, the marginal costs of emission reduction are equal to 
the future stream of damages of climate change avoided by that emission reduction. The 
right hand side of (3) is typically referred to as the marginal damages cost of greenhouse 
gas emissions, the Pigou tax, or the social cost of carbon (34, 35). 
 
Now suppose that there are J different emissions (i.e. different gases and aerosols) that 
affect the climate. The aim is then to solve 
 
(4) 
1 2
1 2
, ,..., 0
( , ,..., , )min
(1 )J
J
t t t t
tR R R t
L R R R D
ρ
∞
= +∑ . 
 
Following standard methods for optimization (e.g., Sundaram, 1996), the first-order 
conditions are 
 
(5) (1 ) (1 ) ,t ss sj j
s tt s s t
D TL L t j
R D T R
ρ ρ∞− −
=
∂ ∂∂ ∂+ = − + ∀∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∑ . 
 
That is, the discounted marginal abatement cost for emission j should equal the marginal 
damage cost of emission j. The marginal cost of damage given by (5) is per mass unit of 
emission. Due to large difference in the physical properties of different climate agents 
(e.g. lifetimes and radiative efficiencies) the marginal costs of damage will be very 
different. 
 
A global climate policy based on (5) demands full knowledge about damages as well as 
mitigation costs. If these were known this framework would give global reductions for 
each component as a function of time. The optimal mitigation could be achieved either by 
giving out quotas for each component to each single emitter according to their known 
mitigation costs, or by assigning emission metrics to each component and letting each 
emitter decide how best to achieve their total emission constraint. To assign the 
appropriate weights for different emissions, we normalize with respect to emissions of 
CR, a reference gas (usually carbon dioxide). We can then rewrite Equation (5) to 
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(6) 
(1 )
,
(1 )R R
ss s
j j
s tt s s t
ss s
C C
s t s st t
D TL L
R D T R t jL D TL
D TR R
ρ
ρ
∞ −
=
∞ −
=
∂ ∂∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ∀∂ ∂ ∂∂ +∂ ∂∂ ∂
∑
∑
. 
 
This is unity for j=CR. The ratio of marginal abatement costs should equal the ratio of 
marginal damage costs. In principle, the marginal abatement cost should equal the tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions, or the price of tradable permits. Therefore, Equation (6) 
specifies how much higher the tax on j should be relative to the tax on CR. Alternatively, 
Equation (6) specifies how many (climate) equivalent tonnes of emissions of CR there are 
in a tonne of emissions of j. That is, Equation (6) establishes equivalence between 
emissions of different climate species. The right-hand side of Equation (6) is the Global 
Damage Potential.2 Note that the equivalence established by Equation (6) is valid for a 
pulse emission reduction at time t and as such will be different for emission reductions at 
different points in time. 
 
One may argue that discounting is unethical, or that choosing an appropriate discount rate 
is too controversial and set ρ=0 and at the same time capping the time horizon at H by the 
argument that the far future is very uncertain.3 One may argue that climate change 
damage estimates are controversial and uncertain, and instead use the temperature as an 
indicator of climate impacts – or assume that impacts are proportional to temperature. 
Then (6) reduces to 
 
(7) ,
R R R
H H s
s s
j j j
s t s t tt t t
H RH s
s s
C RC C
s t s t tt t t
T T F CL
R R F C R t jL T T F C
R F CR R
τ τ
τ τ τ
τ τ
τ τ τ
= = =
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑∑
∀
                                                
. 
 
A further simplification is to assume that the climate change damage is linear in radiative 
forcing (rather than in temperature), or alternatively to assume that the temperature 
 
2 Eckaus (1992) first suggested this. Kandlikar (1995) coined the term. 
3 Note that a finite time horizon is equivalent to an infinite discount rate at the final year of analysis. 
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change is linear in radiative forcing4. Either of these assumptions lead (directly from 
Equation (6) or via Equation (7)) to 
 
(8) ,
R R
H
s s
j j
s tt s t
RH
s s
C R C
s tt s t
F dCL
R C dR t jL F dC
R C dR
=
=
∂∂
∂ ∂= ∀∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∑
∑
. 
 
The right-hand side of Equation (8) is the (pulse) Global Warming Potential as defined 
by the IPCC (32) and applied in the Kyoto Protocol where the (absolute) Global 
Warming Potential (the numerator of Equation (8)) for emission j and a time horizon of 
H is defined by 
 
(9)  ∫= HO jjj dttcaHAGWP )()( .
 
Here aj is the specific radiative forcing (e.g. in units of Wm-2kg-1) and so is equivalent to 
the ∂Fs/∂Cs term in Equation (8), while cj(t) is the concentration at time t due to a unit 
pulse emission at time t=0 and is equivalent to the ∂Cs/∂Rt term in Equation (8). 
Obviously, Equation (8) is a discrete sum in time-steps of one year, while Equation (9) 
uses infinitesimally small times steps and is thus written as an integral. Note that in 
standard IPCC usage of the Global Warming Potential, the background concentrations of 
all gases other than j are taken to be constant, thereby ignoring radiative saturation effects 
(CO2, CH4 and N2O) and adjustment time changes (CO2 and CH4) in the case of 
increasing background concentrations. 
 
Hence, the Global Warming Potential can be viewed as a special case of the Global 
Damage Potential in Equation (6), and consequently can be viewed, subject to the 
validity of the assumptions leading to its derivation, as a cost-benefit analysis tool. The 
                                                 
4 The assumption of linearity between forcing and temperature is with respect to magnitude of forcing, time 
development of forcing and forcing mechanism. This assumption implicitly makes the metric independent 
of uncertainty in the climate sensitivity. 
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Global Warming Potential was designed as a purely physical indicator of the relative 
climate impact of different emissions, and so this interpretation may seem surprising to 
some. However, this has been known amongst economics; it was noted by Fankhauser 
(1994). Nevertheless, given the difficulties in defining damage functions and the 
difficulties in reaching consensus over whether, or to what extent, discounting should be 
applied, the Global Warming Potential is arguably a robust and transparent version of the 
Global Damage Potential.  
 
3. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Global Temperature change Potentials and Global 
Cost Potentials 
 
In Section 2, we approached climate policy through cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit 
analysis is controversial for issues such as climate change because costs of both 
mitigation and adaptation are difficult and controversial to quantify. Instead one may 
define a target for emissions, concentrations, or temperatures and try to meet that target at 
the least cost. Indeed, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is 
phrased in such terms, commonly referred to as cost-effectiveness analysis. Article 2 
states that policies and measures to address a human-induced climate change shall 
stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases “at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, and that the measures 
should be “comprehensive” and “cost-effective” (Article 3.3). 
 
Note that cost-effectiveness analysis is a special case of cost-benefit analysis. For 
convenience, let us assume that the target is formulated as a temperature threshold, TH. If 
Dt=∞ for Tt>TH and Dt=0 for Tt≤TH, then (4) becomes 
 
(10)  
1 2
1 2
1 1 1 0
, ,..., 0
( , ,..., )min  s.t. ( , ( ( , , ,..., )))
(1 )J
J
t t t
t t t t t t t HtR R R t
L R R R T T F C C R R R Tρ
∞
− − −
=
≤+∑ . 
The first-order conditions are 
(11) (1 ) (1 ) ,t sssj j
s tt t
TL t j
R R
ρ λ ρ∞− −
=
∂∂ + = + ∀∂ ∂∑  
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where λt is the LaGrange multiplier (or shadow price in economic jargon) of the 
temperature constraint at time t. If the constraint does not bite, λt=0. This is obviously the 
case for the earlier years. One may argue that the dynamics of the carbon cycle, the 
energy system and climate policy are such that the temperature is likely to touch the 
threshold and then fall (slightly) below it. Atmospheric stabilisation would require the 
commercialisation of carbon-neutral or even carbon-negative energy technology, and 
once that is achieved, CO2 emissions would fall to a level at which concentrations would 
decline. Even if carbon-neutral energy requires taxes or subsidies, there would be lobby 
in place (either treasury or industry) to keep them even after the target will be met.5 If 
that is the case, λt=0 in later years too. Left with a single period t=b in which the 
constraint bites, (11) simplifies to 
 
(12) (1 ) (1 ) ,t bbbj j
t t
TL t j
R R
ρ λ ρ− −∂∂ + = + ∀∂ ∂ . 
 
Normalising this with emissions CR, this becomes 
(13) ,
R R
b
j j
t t
b
C C
t t
TL
R R t jL T
R R
∂∂
∂ ∂= ∀∂ ∂
∂ ∂
. 
 
The right-hand side is again an equivalence. It is the ratio of the shadow prices; that is, 
the relative force with which the different gases would break the constraint. Note again 
that the metric value for gas j relative to the reference gas CR as established by the ratio 
on the right hand side of Equation 13 (as for equation 6) is valid for a pulse emission 
reduction at time t, and as such will change over time. Interestingly, the penalty of 
breaking the constraint, λb, drops out of Equation (12). That implies that the shadow price 
ratio is a purely physical concept (albeit grounded in economics).6 It in fact equals the 
(pulse) Global Temperature change Potential (27, 29). A key uncertainty in climate 
                                                 
5 Note that such reasoning would not hold if Equation (10) had a constraint on the rate of warming, rather 
than its level. 
6 When the constraint does not bind, the ratio of marginal costs in the least cost solution can be expressed 
as a purely physical ratio (36). 
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research is the limited knowledge about the sensitivity of the climate system, i.e. the 
temperature response to a given radiative forcing (33). It may appear from Equation (13) 
to be of less importance since the right hand side of Equation (13) is the ratio of the 
temperature changes, and thus the climate sensitivity apparently cancels – but only if 
forcing efficacy is the same (27). Furthermore, the time until the constraint bites (t=b) 
will be shorter the higher the climate sensitivity. Thus the metric value for short-lived 
species increases with increasing climate sensitivity (29). 
 
The ratio of shadow prices and the Global Temperature change Potential coincide, but 
only under the assumption that there is no capital stock turnover or technological effects 
in abatement. Power generation is an example. If one decides to build a gas-fired power 
plant rather than a coal-fired one, the plant is still there several decades later. If one 
invests in R&D to reduce the costs of photovoltaic power, it will be cheaper forever.  
 
If we add that current abatement costs depend on past abatement, (10) becomes 
(14) 
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 0 0 0
, ,..., 0
( , ,..., , , ,..., ,..., , ,..., )min  s.t. 
(1 )J
J J J
t t t t t t t
t HtR R R t
L R R R R R R R R R T Tρ
∞
− − −
=
≤+∑ . 
 
The first-order conditions are 
(15) 
0
(1 ) (1 ) ,t s bt s bbj j
s t t
L T t j
R R
ρ λ ρ∞ − − −+
=
∂ ∂+ = + ∀∂ ∂∑  
 
where s is time after t.7 Rearranging and normalising, this yields 
(16) 1
1
(1 )
,
(1 )R R R
t st b t s
bj j j
st t t
t st b t s
bC C C
st t t
L T L
R R R t jL T L
R R R
λ ρ
λ ρ
∞ − −+
=
∞ − −+
=
∂ ∂ ∂− +∂ ∂ ∂= ∀∂ ∂ ∂− +∂ ∂ ∂
∑
∑
. 
 
                                                 
7 Note that the left-hand side sums to infinite on the assumption that climate policy will have to be 
maintained forever. If climate policy can be abandoned after a certain date, the partial derivatives are zero 
after then. 
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Equation (13) is clearly a special case of Equation (16). While the right hand side of 
Equation (13) is purely physical, the right hand side of Equation (16) combines physics 
and economics, by including terms that account for future economic gains from emission 
reduction. 
 
Capital stock turnover is probably the most important reason why emission reduction 
costs are not independent between periods. In Reference (21), it is the only dynamic 
effect. This implies that Equation (13) and (16) are close if the temperature constraint is 
relatively far in the future. Power plants have a lifetime of some forty years, so Equation 
(13) can be used to approximate Equation (16) if the temperature threshold is not 
expected to be reached in the next forty years. If the target is closer, the purely physical 
metric of Equation (13) is insufficient, and one would need to use Equation (16), which 
can be computed using existing detailed models of energy infrastructure. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We derive a series of alternative metric concepts to quantify the trade-offs between 
reducing different climate-changing emissions. Each alternative metric establishes 
equivalence between emissions, or an exchange rate. We show that the alternative metrics 
proposed in the literature are special cases of the Global Damage Potential, the metric 
based on cost-benefit analysis. The Global Damage Potential is equal to the ratio of the 
marginal damage costs of emissions. If one assumes that climate impacts are proportional 
to radiative forcing, assumes a finite horizon and a zero discount rate, the Global Damage 
Potential becomes the Global Warming Potential, the metric currently used in 
international climate policy. However, none of these ifs is valid. 
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a special case of cost-benefit analysis (although again 
under incredible assumptions), but it is more usually seen as an alternative. In a cost-
benefit analysis, the policy target and least-cost trajectory to meet that target are 
simultaneously derived. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, the policy target is based on a 
political process, and only the least-cost trajectory is derived. We show that, in a cost-
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effectiveness analysis, the appropriate metric is the ratio of the shadow prices of the 
constraint on total radiative forcing, the Global Cost Potential. The shadow price consists 
of two components: (1) the effect of emission reduction in one period on emission 
reduction costs in a later period; and (2) the contribution to temperature increase with 
which the constraint is broken. If the first were zero (it is not), the Global Cost Potential 
is a purely physical concept and, if the constraint is binding for a short time only, 
coincides with the Global Temperature change Potential, that is, the ratio of the marginal 
effects on global warming at the time of the constraint. 
 
We hope that establishing the relationships between the different concepts for 
equivalences will allow for a more constructive discussion between the proponents of the 
different metrics. We also identify the crucial parameters that drive the different 
estimates of the numerical values between and within metrics. The above framework can 
readily be replicated for alternative indicators (e.g., impacts driven by precipitation) or 
alternative thresholds (e.g., the rate of warming), or indeed, given its generality, for 
impacts beyond climate change. Also in these cases, there is a physico-economic metric 
that can be approximated with a purely physical metric – and that approximation can be 
more or less accurate. As policy makers seem to prefer purely physical metrics,8 
estimates of the approximation accuracy are desirable, although perhaps impractical to 
provide. 
 
There is one immediate policy implication. The UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change is phrased in terms of cost-effectiveness analysis – there is a target (i.e., avoiding 
dangerous climate change) that is to be met at minimum cost. Yet, the Kyoto Protocol, 
the first step towards meeting the long-term target, uses Global Warming Potentials, a 
cost-benefit concept, as the tool for implementation of a multi-gas approach. This is 
inconsistent. If a target-based policy is technologically and politically feasible and if it 
can be taken for granted that it will be possible to stay below the target after the target 
year, changing the metric of equivalence between emissions could be a way of resolving 
this inconsistency between the adopted regime and adopted tool. This needs further 
                                                 
8 One can also argue that the IPCC has not granted policy makers the option of choice. 
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considerations and dialog between policymakers and scientist from several disciplines is 
required (37). 
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